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Music and Its Images as a Source 
of a Creative Myth
In an important passage from Book VIII of Politics (8.5, 1340a 18-42) - the 
book that focuses on an education worthy of a free citizen, considering the 
impact of the arts on the improvement of a man's moral character - Aristotle 
developed the famous comparison of the mimetic and expressive capabilities 
of music and painting; a comparison which, when applied in widely varying 
contexts and theoretical configurations, still retains its validity. Bearing in 
mind music’s capability of affecting emotions, which was noted since at least 
the age of Damon the Pythagorean, and the mysterious affinity connecting 
rhythms and melodies with the “moral qualities” of the soul, Aristotle con­
sidered the impact of music on the development of the listener’s ethical stance 
to be superior - indeed unmatched. The reason for this was as follows: while 
“[...] the other objects of sensation contain no representation of character, 
for example the objects of touch and taste (though the objects of sight do 
so slightly, for there are forms that represent character, but only to a small 
extent, and not all men participate in visual perception of such qualities; also 
visual works of art are not representations of character but rather the forms 
and colours produced are mere indications of character”. Works of music, in 
contrast “[...] do actually contain in themselves imitations of character; and 
this is manifest, for even in the nature of mere melodies there are differences, 
so that people when hearing them are affected differently and have not the 
same feelings in regard to each of them [..J”.1 Thus, music contains in itself 
“representations and imitations of character”, whose exceptional significance 
lies in the fact that they retain an essential similarity to ethical states, a sim­
ilarity lying in their nature: “homoiomata ton ethon, mimemata ton ethon”.
1 Aristotle, Politics, translated by H. Rackham, London-Cambridge MA, 1959.
2 In his translation, Halliwell substituted the concepts of ''imitations’’ and “representa­
tions” with “mimetic equivalents” and “likenesses”; cf. S.' Halliwell, The Aesthetics of 
Mimesis. Ancient Texts and Modern Problems, Princeton-Oxford, 2002, p. 240.
Even a translation of the above passage proved to be difficult;2 its inter­
pretation is no less complicated. Aristotle certainly highlights the fact that 
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the ethical influence of music is rooted in natural human experience: music 
(as well as the other mimetic arts) provides us with an opportunity for cog­
nition, while the feeling for melody and rhythm as well as the entire instinct 
for imitation are innate to human beings (cf. Poetics 4.1448b 5-24, Politics 8.5, 
1340b 17-18). Music may fulfill various cultural functions (hence the divi­
sion into “ethical melodies, melodies of action and passionate melodies”) and 
should be practised with many beneficial goals in mind, these being spiritual 
purification (“katharsis”), entertainment (“paidia”), education (“paideia”), and, 
finally, “diagoge” - “a difficult term”, as was noted by Stephen Halliwell, the 
author of one of the most perceptive interpretations of Aristotle’s theory of 
art, “covering the cultured exercise of leisure in ways sufficiently serious to 
contribute to happiness”.3
3 S. Halliwell, op. cit, p. 239.
4 Ibid., p. 241.
5 Ibid, p. 172.
6 Ibid, p. 174.
Without delving into the various contentious issues regarding the explica­
tion of Aristotle’s theory of the ethical importance of a musical experience, 
we may repeat, after Halliwell, that musical “mimemata ton ethon” have the 
status of “representational-cum-expressive equivalents or correlates”, while 
“music possesses certain ‘ethical’ qualities because it makes ‘us’, as we hear 
it, recognize and (learn to) feel equivalent qualities ‘sympathetically’”.4 In the 
broader perspective of the conception of mimesis as the basis for the arts, 
Halliwell underlines the crucial complementary aspects of an artistic repre­
sentation, “its status as created artefact, as the product of an artistic shaping 
of artistic materials, as well as its capacity to signify and ‘enact’ the patterns of 
supposed realities”.5 In this manner, Aristotle avoided the two theoretical 
extremes: reducing a work of art to the level of a surrogate for the perceived 
world, or bringing it to “aesthetic absolutisms of the contrary kind (aestheti­
cism, formalism, the semiotics of the autonomous text)”.6
Regardless of the paths followed by the later theory of the meaning of 
music and musical expression, three issues are of fundamental importance here 
since they form the foundation for the theory of the art of sound, including 
the delineation of the areas of potential problems to be solved. These are, 
firstly, the indissoluble connection between the issue of musical expression 
and the issue of the meaning of music; secondly, the irremovable reference, 
through the feeling of pleasure or displeasure, to the ethical/emotional sphere; 
thirdly, the emphasis on the directness of a musical piece and its unsurpassed 
affective power. Even today, the issue of musical expression, though it is most 
often reduced to an analysis of expression in “pure” music, i.e. not linked 
directly with words and outside the pretensions of the so-called program­
matic music, remains a challenge and a mystery to art theory and aesthet­
ics. As a rule, it is underlined that any credible theory of musical expression
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(a) must not treat a musical piece as a simple cause of a physiological/psy- 
chological nature or a pretext for the feeling, or the evocation, of emotions;
(b) must consider the concrete presence of the piece, the listening to which is, 
ultimately, an aim in itself or is self-rewarding.  These principles by no means 
aim at a reduction of the reception of a musical piece to the perception of the 
pure form. They do not mean an analysis of the pure sound structure, empty 
of all extramusical references (which was the approach of, for instance, Eduard 
Hanslick); nor do they mean that the experience of the musical piece should 
be narrowed to purely aesthetic qualities. As was already noted by Aristotle, 
art causes an extraordinary transformation to occur: objects that may be dis­
gusting or unpleasant when seen in reality are enjoyable when their “accurate 
likenesses” are presented in a work of art {Poetics 1448b, 9-14). In his brilliant 
article, Jerrold Levinson analyses the typically Aristotelian issue of the pres­
ence of “negative emotions” in music and states:
7
7 Literature on the subject is vast; above all, see M. Budd, Music and Emotions, London, 
1985.
8 J. Levinson, “Music and Negative Emotion” in: idem, Music, Art & Metaphysics. Essays 
in Philosophical Aesthetics, Ithaca-London, 1990, p. 330.
9 “Furthermore, in exercising our feeling capacities on music we might be said to tone 
them up, or get them into shape, thus readying ourselves for intenser and more focused 
reactions to situations in life” - Levinson, op. cit., p. 326.
By imaginatively identifying our state with that of the music, we derive from a suit­
ably constructed composition a sense of mastery and control over - or at least accom­
modation with - emotions that in the extramusical setting are thoroughly upsetting, 
and over which we hope to be victorious when and if the time comes. And emotional 
response, it should be emphasized, seems necessary to reap this benefit.
Further on he emphasises that the act of experiencing these emotions is inher­
ently rooted in experiencing the artistic sphere of the work, and concludes:
For it is manifest that one cannot categorize the emotion in a passage, hear one's emo­
tion transmuted in the course of a development section, or glory in the Power and 
richness of one's expression of emotion in sound without attending explicitly to the 
musical matter of what is before one’s ears. The music is not just a means to an end 
which can be understood apart from it, but integrally involved in that end.8
According to Levinson, “enjoyment, understanding and self-assurance” 
are the three most important qualities which, from the point of view of the 
listeners, are inherent in music when expressing negative emotions (such as, 
for instance, sadness or melancholy); they constitute, at least to some extent, 
a reflection of the aims of listening to music as stated by Aristotle: as a com­
bination of pleasure, cognition and improvement of the ethical character of 
the soul.9 They are essentially inseparable and cannot occur outside the con­
text of the concrete experience of a musical piece.
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It is not surprising that this synthesising power of a musical piece - which 
through its ideal (universal) structure which is based on a higher, absolute 
mathematical harmony unifies the feeling of pleasure, the cognitive aspect 
and the ethical potential, and which at the same time affects the listener’s 
soul directly and with extraordinary strength - caused the Romantics to 
deem music an absolute art. Music was thus assigned the role of the for­
mal and expressive model for all other arts, and its absolute status was to 
be the ultimate fulfilment of art’s highest calling as the crowning achieve­
ment and absolute synthesis of all human cognitive and creative powers. 
The language of music was considered the purest, the most perfect and abso­
lute because it had been the original language of the human race10 - a lan­
guage which had not yet felt the split between sensuality, feeling and abstract 
thinking, and thus operated outside the artificial boundaries of concept and 
image, or which originated directly from the spiritual unity of human cre­
ative powers not yet touched by the fatal division into spheres of subject and 
object, of nature and culture; a division which alienated man from nature. 
Being an absolute art, music was also considered the expression of abso­
lute freedom: a creation that exceeded, or perhaps outpaced, all the limita­
tions of conceptual language and of imitation that separated art from nature. 
Novalis put it as follows:
10 On this issue, cf. e.g. C. Rosen, The Romantic Generation, Cambridge MA, 1998, pp. 68-78, 
and J. Neubauer, The Emancipation of Music from Language. Departure from Mimesis in 
Eighteenth-Century Aesthetics, New Haven-London, 1986. More broadly on the genesis 
of language, cf. e.g. J. H. Stam, Inquiries into the Origin of Language. The Fate of a Ques­
tion, New York, 1976.
11 All quotations after: Novalis, Die Christenheit oder Europa und andere philosophische Schrif- 
ten, hrsg. von Rolf Toman, Koln, 1996, pp. 200-201.
Nirgends aber ist es auffallender, dass es nur der Geist ist, der die Gegenstande, die 
Veranderungen des Staffs poetisiert, und dass das Schone, der Gegenstand der Kunst uns 
nicht gegeben wird oder in den Erscheinungen schon fertig liegt - als in der Musik. [...] 
Der Musiker nimmt das Wesen seiner Kunst aus sich - auch nicht der leiseste Verdacht 
von Nachahmung kann ihn treffen. Dem Maier scheint die sichtbare Natur uberall vor- 
zuarbeiten, durchaus sein unerreichbares Muster zu sein. Eigentlich ist aber die Kunst 
des Maiers so unabhangig, so ganz a priori entstanden, als die Kunst des Musikers. Der 
Maier bedient sich nur einer unendlich schwereren Zeichensprache als der Musiker; 
der Maier malt eigentlich mit dem Auge. Seine Kunst ist die Kunst, regelmassig und 
schon zu sehn. Sehn ist hier ganz aktiv, durchaus bildende Tatigkeit. Sein Bild ist nur 
seine Chiffre, sein Ausdruck, sein Werkzeug der Reproduktion. [...] Der Musiker hort 
eigentlich auch aktiv. Er hort heraus.11
Music is thus an independent creation, a spiritual artefact that is ultimately 
capable of expressing everything while retaining its absolute, purely construc­
tive character; in this it is an ideal language, like mathematics (cf. the famous 
Monologue of Novalis). Yet the artist does not create from nothing - “er hort 
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heraus” but, instead, in accordance with the logic of ordo inversus,17 he concen­
trates on his own inner side, because at the deepest point of his own spiri­
tuality he discovers the primordial unity with the universe of nature. Nova- 
lis realises that the absolute subjectivity and spontaneity of artistic creation 
cannot be based on Fichte’s pre-reflective “Selbstsetzung des Ichs”. Fichte’s 
“Tathandlung” must be replaced by what Novalis called the “Urhandlung”: 
a unity of action (also artistic action) and thinking which, in essence, comes 
before any subject-object relation. Novalis occasionally termed this primeval, 
indissoluble unity of existence and cognition “Gefuhl”, since it could not be 
conceptually expressed in all its fullness and concreteness. This could be done 
only by art; hence to Novalis, poetry and music were always a “return home”, 
a journey to the spiritual homeland. In his view, a true creator is obedient to 
the language of art as much as he controls it: “Uber die allgemeine Sprache 
der Musik. Der Geist wird frei, unbestimmt angeregt; das tut ihm so wohl, 
das diinkt ihm so bekannt, so vaterlandisch, er ist auf diese kurzen Augen- 
blicke in seiner indischen Heimat”.12 3
12 On this issue, see chiefly Manfred Frank, Gerhard Kurz, Ordo inversus. Zu einer Reflexi­
ons ft gur bet Novalis, Holderlin, Kleist und Kafka, in: Ceist und Zeichen. Festschrift Arthur 
Henkel, hrsg. von Herbert Anton, Bernhard Gajek und Peter Pfaff, Heidelberg, 1977, 
pp. 75-92; also Friedrich Strack, Im Schatten der Neugier. Christliche Tradition und kritische 
Philosophic itn Werk Friedrich von Hardenbergs, Tubingen, 1982.
13 Novalis, op. cit., p. 206.
14 “In der Musik erscheint sie formlich als Offenbarung, als schaffender Idealismus. Hier 
legitimiert sie sich als himmlische Gesandtin, kat anthropon” - Novalis, op. cit., p. 234. 
Cf. B. Naumann, "Musikalisches Ideen-Instrument". Das Musikalische in Poetik und Sprach- 
theorie der Fruhromantik, Stuttgart, 1990.
15 Novalis, op. cit., p. 290.
16 Ibid., p. 201.
Music’s extraordinary, exceptional mission results from the mysterious 
amalgamation of the exact, mathematical structure,14 the key to which is pro­
vided by combinatorics itself,15 with the power of expression that is rooted in 
nature. Yet the creator of music does not imitate the sounds of the external 
world but transforms them into meaningful, ideal structures: “Alle Tone, die 
die Natur hervorbringt, sind rauh und geistlos - nur der musikalischen Seele 
diinkt oft das Rauschen des Waldes, das Pfeifen des Windes, der Gesang der 
Nachtigall, das Platschern des Bachs melodisch und bedeutsam”.16 Music is the 
most emphatic confirmation of the truth of the ordo inversus-, that the senses 
perceive as much as the inner light of the soul allows them to. “Der Mensch 
ist eine Sonne, seine Sinne sind seine Planeten”, affirms Novalis in one of his 
most splendid passages.
It is, therefore, not at all surprising that music is perceived as a mytholo­
gical projection of the future state of perfection, which would be a return to 
what has been lost. “Unsere Sprache war zu Anfang viel musikalischer, und 
hat sich nur nach gerade so prosaisiert, so enttbnt. Es ist jetzt mehr Schallen 
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geworden, Laut, wenn man dieses schone Wort so erniedriegen will. Sie muft 
wieder Gesang werden”.17
17 Ibid., p. 206. Cf. W Janke, Enttonter Gesang - Sprache und Wahrheit in der Fichte-Stu- 
dien des Novalis, in: Erneuerung der Transzendentalphilosophie im Anschlu/3 an Kant und 
Fichte, hrsg. von Klaus Hammacher und Albert Mues, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, 1979, 
pp. 168-203.
18 In one of the passages, for instance, he combined musical metaphors with comparisons 
referring to physiology in order to describe spiritual cognition: “Die Betrachtung der 
Welt fangt im unendlichen, absoluten Diskant, im Mittelpunkt an, und steigt die Skala 
herunter; die Betrachtung unsrer selbst fangt mit dem unendlichen, absoluten Bali an, 
der Peripherie, und steigt die Skala aufwarts. Absolute Vereinigung des Basses und 
Diskants. Dies ist die Systole und Diastole des gottlichen Lebens” - Novalis, op. cit., 
p. 205. The coexistence of the two spheres of reality, expressed through metaphor, is 
at the same time underlined as the absolute necessity of the unification of various areas 
of experience.
19 “Ein Marchen ist wie ein Traumbild, ohne Zusammenhang. Ein Ensemble wunderbarer 
Dinge und Begebenheiten, z.B. eine musikalische Phantasie, die harmonischen Folgen 
einer Aolsharfe, die Natur selbst” - Novalis, op. cit., p. 270. According to Novalis, a true 
fairy tale was at the same time a prophecy and an ideal representation, an absolutely 
necessary one. A fairy tale, as a story that acquired the rank of a myth, needed the 
sensitivity of a child and the audacity of a bard prophesying the future. A myth explained 
the past and foretold the future; a true story would, in time, become a fairy tale - 
a myth. The world of a myth was a total contradiction of the world of the truth, and 
yet was as close to it as chaos was close to the finished creation.
20 Novalis, op. cit., p. 207. Cf. H.-J. Mahl, Verfremdung und Transparenz. Zur theoretischen 
Begriindung der "Tropen und Rdthselsprache" bei Novalis, “Jahrbuch des freien deutschen 
Hochstifts” 1992, pp. 161-182; also L. Stockinger, "Tropen und Rdthselsprache". Eso- 
terik und Offentlichkeit bei Freidrich von Hardenberg (Novalis), in: Geschichtlichkeit und 
Aktualitdt. Festschrift Hans-Joachim Mahl zum 6$. Geburtstag, hrsg. von Klaus-Detlef
Only in poetry can language regain this power of musical expression and 
beauty of musical order; hence Novalis made frequent use of metaphors refer­
ring to areas associated with music.18 Impressions, thoughts and feelings create 
a harmonious whole, they are “consonances”, if they are illuminated by spiri­
tual energy, the fullness of awareness may then be said to be a “Gesang, blofie 
Modulation der Stimmungen”. True poetry that is worthy of this name, i.e. 
symbolic poetry, is a magnified language; it is a language intensified to the 
ultimate boundaries of expression and reference, a language which in its mean­
ingful form is as condensed as a musical piece, where segregation of content, 
form and emotion is an illusory segregation. Such a language is a language of 
myths; for Novalis, it is a language of fairy tales:19
[...] und gehort in die Hieroglyphistik der zweiten Potenz, in die Ton- und Schriftbil- 
dersprache. Sie hat poetische Verdienste und ist nich rhetorisch, subaltern, wenn sie ein 
volkommener Ausdruck, wenn sie euphonisch, richtig und prazis ist, wenn sie gleich- 
sam ein Ausdruck, mit um des Ausdrucks willen ist, wenn sie wenigstens nicht als 
Mittel erscheint, sondern an sich selbst eine von vollkommene Produktion des hohern 
Sprachvermogens ist.20
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It would, however, be a mistake to see the “expression” and “mood” of 
this language of mythological poetry as expounded by Novalis to be identi­
cal with the vulgarised form of the Romantic vision of art as the creation of 
indistinct images expressing the personality of their creator. If poetry was to 
be a revival of the mythological unity of creation and cognition - of the acts 
of creating the world and perceiving the world in the pure, non-mediated full­
ness of sensual nature - then its beginning had to lie in the “depersonalisation” 
of art: a true poet must, in a sense, possess the ability to become everything:
Der Dichter mufi die Fahigkeit haben, sich andre Gedanken vorzustellen, auch Gedan- 
ken in alien Arten der Folge und in den mannichfaltigsten Ausdrucken darzustellen. 
Wie ein Tonkiinstler verschiedene Tone und Instrumente in seinem Innern sich verge- 
genwartigen, sie vor sich bewegen lassen und sie auf mancherlei Weise verbinden kann, 
so da£> er gleichsam der Lebensgeist dieser Klange und Melodien wird, wie gleichfalls 
ein Maier, als Meister und Erfinder farbiger Gestalten, diese nach seinem Gefallen zu 
verandern, gegeneinander und nebeneinander zu stellen, und zu vervielfachen, und 
alle mogliche Arten und einzelne hervorzubringen versteht, so muE> der Dichter den 
reddened Geist aller Dinge und Handlungen in seinen unterschiedlichen Trachten sich 
vorzubilden, und alle Gattungen von Spracharbeiten zu fertigen, und mit besonderm, 
eigentumlichen Sinn zu beseelen vermogend sein.* 21
Muller, Gerhard Pasternack, Wulf Segebrecht und Ludwig Stockinger, Tubingen, 1988, 
pp. 182-206.
21 Novalis, op. cit., pp. 262-263. And elsewhere: “Egoist darf der Dichter durchaus nicht 
erscheinen. Er muft sich selbst Erscheinung sein” - Ibid., p. 292. In the end, poetry was 
a synthesis of cognition and a measure of the universalisation of an experience, leading 
directly to the perfection of humanity: “Der vollendete Mensch muC> gleichsam zugleich 
an mehreren Orten und un mehreren Menschen leben - ihn mussen bestandig ein 
weiter Kreis und mannichfache Begebenheiten gegenwartig sein. Hier bildet sich dann 
die wahre, grofiartige Gegenwart des Geistes, die den Menschen zum eigentlichen Welt­
burger macht [...]” - Ibid., p. 222.
22 Ibid., p. 284.
23 “Nichts ist poetischer, als alle Ubergange und heterogene Mischungen" - Ibid., 
p. 286.
By being an ultimate synthesis, an image of the primeval unity and whole­
ness, poetry also constituted an absolute reality: “Die Poesie ist das echt abso- 
lut Reelle.[...] Je poetischer, je wahrer”.22 Even though divided by impassable 
boundaries, various arts permeate one another;23 this is because our sensual 
modalities not only have no clearly defined boundaries, but also are con­
stantly modified and broadened by contact with the works. To Novalis, this 
was a vital aspect: art, similarly to philosophy, was an ultimate revelation of 
the truth, but not only in the sphere of ideal meanings; it always remained 
a non-reducible, living entity: “Dichten ist zeugen. Alles Gedichtete muft ein 
lebendiges Individuum sein”. Hence contact with a work of art, which was 
aimed at the revelation of truth in the sensual form, resulted, above all, in the 
enrichment of one’s sensuality. What is more, the poetry of the future was to 
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help the human race develop entirely new, never before envisaged organs of 
sensual perception. In this view, the goal of true art was, to put it succinctly, 
to renew the world and to invigorate human cognitive powers.24 “Die Welt 
muC> romantisiert werden. So findet man des ursprunglichen Sinn wieder”, 
Novalis famously exhorted.
24 “Alle Poesie unterbricht den gewohnlichen Zustand, das gemeine Leben, fast wie der 
Schlummer, um uns zu erneuern, und so unser Lebensgefiihl immer rege zu halten”.
25 K. Kroeber, Romantic Landscape Vision: Constable and Wordsworth, Madison, 1975, p. 9.
26 On this issue, cf. classic, model works: R. L. Stein, The Ritual of Interpretation. The Fine 
Arts as Literature in Ruskin, Rossetti, and Pater, Cambridge MA-London, 1975; E. K. Hel- 
singer, Ruskin and the Art of Beholder, Cambridge MA-London, 1982.
27 Cf. the recent, large monograph by P. Vergo, The Music of Painting. Music, Modernism 
and the Visual Arts from the Romantics to John Cage, London, 2010, esp. pp. 206-235.
The concept of a synthesis and mutual correspondence of the arts, so often 
cited as a characteristic feature of the Romantic mindset, certainly played 
a considerable role. Before it was inseparably linked with Wagner, the concept 
of “Gesamtkunstwerk” functioned as an important component of the Roman­
tic theory of art as proposed by Friedrich Schlegel. Yet the conviction that the 
more fully a given work of art realises the potentialities of its medium and 
resists translation into categories of another branch of art, the more perfect it 
is, may be justifiably put forward as a counterpoise to the postulate of a syn­
thesis of the arts originating from either the associationist and synaesthetic 
psychology or from the assumption that the source of creative power lies in 
the imagination. It seems more valid here to point to mutual inspirations and 
interdependences which were not limited to making use of analogies or to 
applying the metaphorical mode of describing a work of art, but originated 
from what Karl Kroeber very aptly termed the “coherence of alternatives”.25 
In this sense the issue was not only to modify the features of one medium 
up to the point when it achieved impression- and representation-generating 
effects typical of a different order of experiencing art (which, in fact, had long 
been required with regard to the ekphrases of works of art by the postulate 
known in the Greek theory of rhetoric as energeia). Nor was it necessary to 
seek ways to envisage music in the structure of a painting, to show Delacroix’s 
“music of painting”, i.e. to discover the formal and perceptual equivalents of 
particular arts, which, after all, was one of the main currents in Romantic 
and Modernist art theory,26 all the way to the desire of painting a fugue.27 
It was possible to choose another way: to pose the problem of mutual rela­
tions between arts as cultural forms and forms of life in the perspective of 
the complementation of meanings at the juncture point between myth and 
history. In this approach, the metamorphosis of, for instance, the meaning 
of a musical piece into a poet's statement constituted neither a weakness of 
perception and a lack of understanding for the form (as the formalists would 
have it) nor a manifestation, dictated by envy, of the concept of a paragone of 
arts. By referring to figures and works from the universe of music or painting, 
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the poet investigated the status of his own work (and, more broadly, of art as 
such) in a world that had relegated art’s cognitive qualities to the margins of 
"beautiful fiction”, invention and aesthetic pleasure. The evocation of history 
through the personage of an authentic or imagined painter or composer tran­
scended the convention of providing a purely thematic pretext and aggregating 
meanings through representational and historical associations. The stakes were 
much higher: a dialogue with the past, conducted in the sphere of an actual 
experience of that past achieved by means of the presence of an artistic form.
The poet who achieved absolute mastery in conversing with the ghosts 
of the past is, of course, Robert Browning. An entirely incurable enthusiast 
of Italy, he shared with many of his contemporaries a deep appreciation for 
the artistic achievements of the Renaissance.28 The heroes of his best dramatic 
monologues - a genre in which Browning remains a past master29 - are Fra 
Filippo Lippi and Andrea del Sarto. Yet he also received a thorough ground­
ing in music and was fascinated with this art throughout his life. He derived 
topics from the history of music several times and, while drawing a captivat­
ing image of the bygone era, an image that unavoidably brings to mind the 
plasticity of description and the “imaginative reason” of Walter Pater or even 
Jacob Burckhardt, he always posed pertinent questions as to the place of art 
in modern society.30
28 Cf. e.g. J. B. Bullen, The Myth of the Renaissance in Nineteenth-Century Writers, Oxford, 
1994.
29 On this issue, cf. chiefly R. Langbaum, “The Dramatic Monologue: Sympathy versus 
Judgement”, in: idem, The Poetry of Experience. The Dramatic Monologue in Modern Literary 
Tradition, New York, 1963, pp. 75-108.
30 Cf. D. J. DeLaura, “The Context of Browning’s Painter Poems: Aesthetics, Polemics, Histo­
ries”, PM LA, 1980, 95, pp. 367-388. Also M. E. Gibson, History and the Prism of Art: Browning's 
Poetic Experiments, Columbus OH, 1987.
Browning may have owed much to the Romantics, but his vision of art 
was no longer Romantic. In his perception, the threat to the realness of the 
world and to the authenticity of existence was posed not by the dullness and 
banality of mundane life, which would require art to promise a “waking dream” 
in a gesture of romanticising the world, but by the confusion in the orders of 
understanding the world, which was due to the pretensions of science and 
the imbalanced relations of art and life. The historical scenery of Renaissance 
personas provided Browning with a perfect space in which to present those 
conflicts. He faultlessly presented, for instance in the superb monologue Fra 
Filippo Lippi, the Renaissance contrast of art and life on the example of an art­
ist battling his own temperament which forces him to present the perceptible 
world in the fullness of its energy and power, without making allowances for 
abstract beauty or falsely envisioned spirituality. It would probably be quite 
justified to suspect that through his masterful use of colloquial, unpolished 
language, with all its hesitations and violent turns, Browning was powerfully 
expressing his protest against the aestheticised vision of Renaissance painting,
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and also against the unearthly, spiritual beauty of Renaissance figures being 
identified with an era of flawless faith which would, in a sense, guarantee 
access to this ideal beauty, excluding corporeality and sensuality as unworthy 
of that purified artistic vision. The tale is a confession; it is Fra Filippo’s 
account of his own life which he is forced to tell to those who caught him 
during one of his many escapades to a bawdy-house:
[...] zooks, sir, flesh and blood,
That’s all I’m made of! Into shreds it went,
Curtain and counterpane and coverlet,
All the bed-furniture - a dozen knots,
There was a ladder! Down I let myself,
Hands and feet, scrambling somehow, and so dropped,
And after them. I came up with the fun
Hard by Saint Laurence, hail fellow, well met [...].
Fra Filippo Lippi is here an artist whose oeuvre represents uncompromis­
ing realism. Yet it soon turns out that his realism finds no approval among 
the hierarchs, and not at all because Lippi has ruthlessly revealed their vices: 
what is found disturbing is the tremendous faithfulness of the representation, 
a realism bordering on illusion, and illusion bordering on magic - all quite 
contrary to the role ascribed to art in the teachings of the Church:
The Prior and the learned pulled a face
And stopped all that in no time. 'How< What’s here1!-
Quite from the mark of painting, bless us all!
Faces, arms, legs and bodies like the true
As much as pea and pea! It’s devil’s game!
Your business is not to catch men with show,
With homage to the perishable clay,
But lift them over it, ignore it all,
Make them forget there’s such a thing as flesh.
Your business is to paint the souls of men [...].
Browning’s mastery lies in the fact that he did not construct a simple 
opposition between Lippi’s style (and, after all, the style is the man) and the 
extra-artistic expectation imposed by the Church. From the point of view of 
art, the motives which stand behind the proposition to paint the soul and to 
morally elevate the observer are not empty; what is at issue is an alteration 
of the order of artistic formation. Lippi’s adversary sees it in the concord of 
a vision open to the world and a vision turned inward, of the way of looking 
away from oneself and into oneself; the order of the world can be captured 
only by a soul that holds on to its own innate order. The debate concerning 
the real or ideal origin of beauty and the struggle between experience and the 
intellectual intuition of perfect forms seems to quiet down here, to lose its 
importance; beauty is of divine origin, but it owes its existence to the existence 
of a world of forms that are visible to the eye and audible to the ear:
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“The world and life’s too big to pass for a dream”. The deeper the artist pen­
etrates into the corporeal structure of reality, the closer he comes not to the 
allure of beauty, but to its meaning:
[...] This world’s no blot for us,
Nor blank; it means intensely, and means good:
To find its meaning is my meat and drink.
It is not the role of an artist to persuade people to piety; his role is to respect 
the real world, and thus to cancel the oppositions between spiritual and sen­
sual art and between form and spirit. Appreciation for lines and colours does 
not turn one’s attention away from the glory of God; quite the opposite, the 
more perfect the art grows, the more it tells of the world. It might be said 
that the realism of the perceptible form opens up the perspective of the real­
ism of the form in the ontological sense:
But why not do as well as say, - paint these
Just as they are, careless what comes of it^
God’s works - paint any one, and count it crime
To let a truth slip. Don’t object, ‘His works
Are here already; nature is complete:
Suppose you reproduce her - (which you can’t)
There’s no advantage! You must beat her, then’.
For, don’t you mark1?- We’re made so that we love
First when we see them painted, things we have passed
Perhaps a hundred times nor cared to see;
And so they are better, painted - better to us,
Which is the same thing. Art was given for that;
God uses us to help each other so,
Lending our minds out.
Art is thus, above all, a way to condense reality, to show the realness of 
the world; it is also a process of concentrating one’s attention that is aided by 
memory; a memory which is devoid of the cultural awareness of history and 
which eliminates the mythological dimension of the past is a flawed memory. 
Hence, the Renaissance is not only a stage for passions, a struggle of unyield­
ing temperaments, an agon of life and beauty; the perfection of the beauty 
of a Renaissance form, a form for its own sake, does not close the debate 
between life and art or the contention between nature’s creative impulse and 
the artist’s creative instinct:
[...] for it seemed, it was certain, to match man’s birth,
Nature in turn conceived, obeying an impulse as I;
And the emulous heaven yearned down, made effort to reach the earth,
As the earth had done her best, in my passion, to scale the sky:
Novel splendours burst forth, grew familiar and dwelt with mine,
Not a point nor peak but fund and fixed its wandering star
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This is what Abt Vogler states. He is not a painter this time, but a composer, 
wishing to characterise his efforts. Significantly, it is in the poems whose 
heroes are the once-famous composers of the 18th century, Charles Avison or 
Baldassare Galuppi from Venice, that Browning focuses on a question which 
is fundamental from the point of view of the development of art and the 
transformation of forms. To him, the beauty of a Renaissance work did not 
have a timeless quality and hence could not be a set pattern for imitation. His 
feeling for historicity prevented Browning from sharing the Pre-Raphaelites’ 
enthusiasm; a myth of beauty was only a myth, a fleeting form, when the 
faith that had once animated it was gone. As we read in Parleyings with Avison,
Soon shall fade and fall
Myth after myth - the husk-like lies I call
New truth’s corolla-safeguard.
An artist’s maturity is evidenced not only by his awareness that form is 
historically changeable, but also by the perception that the language of art, 
being subject to inflexible rules, is limited.
He who works in fresco, steals a hair-brush, 
Curbs the liberal hand, subservient proudly, 
Cramps his spirit, crowds its all in little, 
Makes a strange art of an art familiar, 
Fills his lady’s missal-marge with flowerets.
He who blows thro’ bronze, may breathe thro’ silver,
Fitly serenade a slumberous princess.
He who writes, may write for once as I do
This is what we read in One Word More. Even music, which comes the closest 
to divine beauty and reflects its eternal and unchangeable order, is fleeting, as 
Abt Vogler notes: “Well, it is gone at last, the palace of music I reared”. Yet the 
fleeting shape of music constitutes a paradoxical confirmation of the existence 
of a perfect and absolute Creator, the maker of “houses not made with hands”. 
Silence presupposes and portends configurations of sounds imbued with mean­
ings and emotions, a pause foretells a song that would flow again, dissonance 
heralds harmony. A tone in itself may be quiet or loud, but it is devoid of 
meaning; only when the power of thought brings it in harmony with other 
tones does it fill with expression and acquire the status of an image, a mirror 
of eternal order. In the end, therefore, art requires something that cannot be 
put into rules, something that, as Coleridge would have said, springs from 
the source of the “infinite I AM”.
Instead of Coleridge's “esemplastic power of imagination”, however, Brown­
ing has “the finger of God, a flash of the will”. This is an important difference, 
because Browning is unwilling to absolutise art - “on the earth the broken arcs; 
in the heaven, a perfect round”. The absolute reality of art does not lie in its 
power to bring independent, autarchic worlds into existence; its true might lies 
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in that it reveals the truth and invariability of the experiential order.31 What is 
more, it confirms this order in its temporal, procedural dimension: an image 
hides nothing, in poetry “effect proceeds from the cause”, whereas in music 
expression, form and meaning are the most fully amalgamated because music 
renders the entire dynamics of emotions with all their power, violence and 
sudden fluctuations.
31 As we read in Abt Vogler: “All we have willed or hoped or dreamed of good shall exist; 
/ Not its semblance, but itself; no beauty, nor good, nor power I Whose voice has gone 
forth, but each survives for the melodist I When eternity affirms the conception of an 
hour. / The high that proved too high, the heroic for earth too hard, / The passion 
that left the ground to lose itself in the sky, I Are music sent up to God by the lover 
and the bard; enough that he heard it once: we shall hear it by-and-by”.
32 In a letter to his wife, Elisabeth Barrett Browning, Browning reflected, quoting the 
great composer Claude Le Jeune: “‘In Music, the Beau Ideal changes every thirty years' 
- well, is not that true4 The Idea, mind, changes, - the general standard [...] - next 
hundred years, who will be the Rossini^’; quoted after: Robert Browning's Poetry, ed. 
J. F. Loucks and A. M. Stauffer, New York-London, 2007, p. 203, note 3.
The ultimate effect of a work of art is, however, a mystery. The language 
of music, subordinate to the rules of composition, has an immeasurable wealth 
of expression and remains in a natural relationship with the sphere of passions 
which is most indefinite and mysterious. Even such a great artist as Hugues 
of Saxe-Gotha, the master of the fugue, is very well aware that beauty and 
emotion do not necessarily yield to the strict principles of counterpoint and 
to the sequence of themes:
One dissertates, he is candid;
Two must discept, - has distinguished;
Three helps the coupe, if ever yet man did;
Four protests; Five makes a dart at the thing wished [...].
Art is thus always a sphere of experimentum crucis, the key to which is the 
constantly renewed experience of the artistic form in the mirror of nature, 
and whose criteria are truth and beauty:
Over our heads truth and nature -
Still our life’s zigzags and dodges,
Ins and outs, weaving a new legislature -
God’s gold Just shining its last where that lodges,
Palled beneath Man’s usurpature.
Both Abt Vogler, the genius of extempore composition, and Master Hugues 
of Saxe-Gotha, a man intimately familiar with the arcane mysteries of coun­
terpoint, underscore their individuality, whose concentration conditions the 
concentration of form. Yet they constantly point to the creator’s limitations: 
the dynamics of history32 and the unpredictability of the work’s expression 
force an artist to maintain a distance towards his art:
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Est fuga, volvitur rota.
On we drift: where looms the dim port4
One, Two, Three, Four, Five contribute their quota;
Something is gained, if one caught but the import -
Show it us, Hugues of Saxe-Gotha!
This is aided by the form of the dramatic monologue, in which the relations 
between, on the one hand, the author, the narrator, the titular and postulated 
protagonist, and the fictitious personages shaping the space of the presented 
world by their absence, and, on the other hand, the reader, are undermined. 
The changing points of view, the effortless passages from inner reflections to 
external events, and the multiplication of references to the mirror images of 
the protagonist cause the reader to feel uncertain as to his position, while his 
perspective is constantly disrupted and called into question.
Thus the form of the dramatic monologue reveals one more key aspect 
of art’s mission, in addition to revealing the truth of the order of experien­
cing the world; it is the task of contradicting the generally accepted practices, 
of questioning the generally assumed points of view. Exquisitely applying 
the inconsistency, picturesqueness and bluntness of colloquial speech, that 
“unpoetical material” that was so admired by TS. Eliot, Browning exposes the 
unfounded pretensions of religious faith and science - the two fundamental, 
and violently conflicted, ways of understanding the world - and reveals their 
barrenness. This, of course, brings to mind Browning’s masterpieces, such as 
The Ring and the Book or Caliban upon Setebos. In this contest, art may serve 
as a temporary arbitrator: by making beauty a reality it recreates the order of 
the created world, whereas by revealing the real, authentic experiential order 
in depicting passions it forces us to approach science’s claim to presenting the 
only true image of the world with some detachment. Browning might repeat 
after Konrad Fiedler that artistic vision begins where science ends.
Music, too, makes us able to see; while listening to Galuppi's toccatas, the 
image of the halcyon days of Venice unfolds in our imagination. His music 
inspires reflection upon morality in history,33 as long as the past provides us 
with certain mythological images, i.e. signposts without which it is simply 
impossible to obtain the bearings of our culture. Galuppi’s interlocutor is well 
aware that, to use Plato’s words, beauty is a difficult thing: “But although 
I take your meaning, 'tis with such a heavy mind!”. But the Venetian master’s 
toccatas are alive in as much as (and from the interlocutor’s perspective it is 
“your old music”) they evoke images of the city:
33 Of. S. Hawlin, “Browning’s A Toccata of Galuppi's: How Venice Once Was Dear", Review 
of English Studies, 1990, 41, pp. 496-509.
Ay, because the sea’s street there; and ‘tis arched by ...what you call...
Shylock’s bridge with houses on it, where they kept the carnival:
I was never out of England - it’s as if I saw it all.
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Galuppi’s music is admired, it brings purely sensual pleasure, it is the life’s 
ornament and a sweeping expression of passion: “Brave Galuppi! That was 
music! good alike at grave and gay!”. But this is only an illusion, because the 
pieces composed by Galuppi are much more than that: they symbolise a cer­
tain state of mind, a form of life, they convey meanings his contemporaries 
did not notice:
Then they left you for their pleasure: till in due time, one by one,
Some with lives that came to nothing, some with deeds as well undone, 
Death stepped tacitly and took them where they never see the sun.
The fate of Venice ought to be a warning that, in the end, art and the cultural 
myth cannot serve as substitutes for reality:
As for Venice and her people, merely born to bloom and drop,
Here on earth they bore their fruitage, mirth and folly were the crop:
What of soul was left, I wonder, when the kissing had to stop4
The answer must be sought in Galuppi’s music - because only art preserves 
the memory of experiences, in comparison with which our own ethical and 
intellectual order, cloaked in the mystery of artistic expression, can be defined 
anew.
(Translated by Klaudyna Michatowicz)
Abstract
Music was commonly regarded as one of the most powerful arts. In line with a very long 
tradition reaching back to the Pythagoreans and to Plato and Aristotle, it was its blend of 
mathematical structure and unusual power of “expression of affects” that was particularly 
highly regarded. Although music was initially considered as belonging to the circle of 
imitational arts, it gradually obtained the incomparable status of an absolute art. In par­
ticular, Music played an exceptional role in the early Romantic theories of art, when it 
was perceived as an epitome of artistic creation and the highest possible extension of 
human cognition through pure activity of the imagination. This article attempts to describe 
chosen aspects of the myth of music as a fulfilment of man’s imaginary strivings by draw­
ing on examples of Novalis (poetry and music as utopian arts of an idealiter construction) 
and of Robert Browning (music as a source of poetical imagination activated as a faculty 
of historical understanding).
